

# Introduction to MBSE: Systems Modeling Expressing Design Intent With Rigor

Model Based Engineering: Enabling the Vision Phoenix Integration Virtual Event

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#### Abstract

- Traditional Document-Intensive Systems Engineering (DISE) is undergoing a transformation; the emergence of Model-Based Systems Engineering (MBSE) is driving fundamental changes to product development and sustainment processes. However, competent modelers are in short supply and many stakeholders do not fully understand (or appreciate) the implications and opportunities inherent in MBSE.
- This tutorial will provide an overview of what system modeling is, how it can rigorously express design intent, and how appreciation for its capabilities can facilitate digital engineering throughout the enterprise. It will include an overview of fundamental concepts, present detailed examples, discuss the role of automated validation in driving model quality, and share best practices for identifying and training system modelers.

#### An Abstract View of Product Development/Acquisition



#### Air Gaps



#### Fidelity and momentum is lost every time there is a handoff; this is caused by the "air gaps"




# **Digital Engineering**



Digital Engineering / Digital Thread / Digital Twin Intended to Eliminate Air Gaps

#### Future State of Digital Engineering



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#### Descriptive vs. Executable Architectures and Models

System Modeling Tools


Descriptive

#### Modeling & Simulation Tools

# Executable




#### Situation – Demands, Risk, Speed, and Change Threaten Mission Success



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# System Complexity Is Growing Exponentially



https://savi.avsi.aero/about-savi/savi-motivation/exponential-system-complexity/

The U.S. Department of Defense Recognizes Current Approaches Cannot Manage this Explosion in Complexity

# **66** Our current defense acquisition system applies industrial age processes to solve information age problems. - LtGen Robert D. McMurray, AFLCMC/CC



#### The Law of Conservation of Systems Engineering



The amount of systems engineering required for a given project is fixed. You don't get to choose how much systems engineering you do. You simply get to choose when you do it (up front, or during integration and testing), how much positive impact it has, and how much it costs. - James Long, FINCOSE

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Systems Architecture: Managing that Complexity

# Architecting defines what to design, while design defines what to build.

- Hillary Sillitto, Architecting Systems: Concepts, Principles, and Practice

A high-fidelity simulation of the wrong system is wrong.

# Legacy Systems & Digital Engineering Complexity

- Digital Engineering Processes (...really, most Systems Engineering processes) are intended for:
  - New development
  - · An older, single-source procurement environment
    - Intra- vs Inter-organizational stovepipes leading to unexpected model management problems and costs
  - Tailoring...but don't tell you HOW to tailor effectively
    - The pitfalls of frameworks
    - Inexperienced practitioners attempting advanced modification
- Common Challenges
  - · Existing system documentation is unavailable or out of date
    - · Older documentation standards, lack of funding to update CDRLs, old data rights agreements, etc.
  - · Configuration management of systems in the field has degraded
  - Sustainment & Development organizations are stove-piped or firewalled...or not under contract
  - Shifting Baselines: Operations can't stop and wait for DE...which may never catch up
  - · Lack of DE-capable development environment accessible to all stakeholders
  - Lack of available process and tool experts
  - "Magic Sauce" expectations for Model Based Systems Engineering (MBSE)

#### A Big Picture with Fuzzy Boundaries

**MBSE** 

SE Digital Thread

Digital Twin/Model Baser

**Product Support** 


Architecture and Requirements (Design Intent)

Detailed Design, BOM Specialty Engineering Analysis Test, Integration, Verification, OA/ATO Predictive Modeling & Simulation Cost, Schedule, CM/BM


Problem Reports, Defects, Feedback Actual System Configurations Real-time Data, IoT Recorded Performance Logistics Databases

= Legacy systems want to live here, but often lack crucial data from the inner circles

### Another (Pessimistic?) View




### From the Department of Defense Digital Engineering Strategy (2018)



#### Where to Start a Digital Transformation?

#### Aligning Outcomes For a Clear Transformation

- Apply SE to planning DE: Who are your stakeholders? What are your use cases?
- SAIC has developed Program Interviews to determine Program and Organizational readiness for MBSE and Digital Engineering transformation efforts.
- Program Interviews help determine where and what Programs/Organizations need to address to have the mostly likelihood of success.
  - To evaluate capabilities  $\rightarrow$  assess as-is state
  - To refine and build-up capabilities → execute to-be transition



Tip For Legacy Programs: Expect to identify all your existing system data owners, data rights, data formats, predicted level of data accuracy, and names of SMEs that can fill in gaps


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# Model-Based Systems Engineering (MBSE) is a component of DE

Often the First Step in Implementing Digital Engineering

Tip For Legacy Programs: Start with your physical architecture






Initially, MBSE covers requirements and architecture management

and then extends to cover integration, verification, and validation

# **Digital Engineering Strategy Distilled**

#### Starting with the End in Mind...or Just Starting at the End?

I. Model and integrate data across full enterprise lifecycle



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#### Barriers to Building Your First Architecture Model


#### Skills, Bench Depth, and Recruiting



- The digital transformation of systems engineering depends upon the creation of well-crafted, consistent, and complete descriptive and executable system models.
- Skilled modelers are in short supply
- Growing new modelers requires coaching and guidance
- Many ways to build a bad model
- Models are huge and complex to review (manually) (10<sup>^5</sup>-10<sup>6</sup> elements)
- Our semantic broker is a promising technology that facilitates data interchange
- Aras Innovator / Ansys Minerva / PLM vendor solutions (DS, PTC, Siemens)

#### Building a Better Model

Start with a Solid Model Style & Automatic Validation



Tip For Legacy Programs: Know when to cut your losses when it comes to reusing legacy models Drawing → Diagram → Data

**SAIC** 

- Modeler only directly influences the methodology
- When style guides and ontologies are followed, queries may be constructed in the model to return information of interest:
  - Properties
  - Usages
  - Related elements
- Unfortunately the style guide and other rules are not always followed consistently

#### \*Warning:

- Frameworks are not languages
- Languages do not dictate methodology
- Tools do not dictate methodology

## Why Use a Model Style Guide?

- SysML provides too many options: a model style selects an optimal set of options an organization agrees to restrict themselves to.
  - Everyone uses the same options
  - Only a portion of the language is used
- Engineers new to modeling need to focus representing their technical content in the model, not selecting the best modeling technique
- Training can be shorter and more effective
- Model analysis is easier to implement

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
- Model-to-Model compatibility is improved
- Integration of the model with external tools is simplified

#### A Style Guide is a Key Enabler for MBSE Program Success

**Digital Transformation** 

BOM CentricSystem CentricJesting holistic view of design intentImage: Centric sector of the sector of th

# Digital Tapestry: Custom and Partial Digital Threads



Each enterprise/team has custom priorities ... but all data connects through System Architecture

Graphic courtesy of aras

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#### Architecture Is Part of Systems Engineering

- Systems engineering focuses on behaviors, structure, requirements, and relationships related to the system-of-interest
- Traditional, Document-Intensive Systems Engineering (DISE), relies on humans-in-the-loop to read and understand narrative and graphical content ... and to integrate it into a coherent understanding of the system and its architecture
- DISE approaches are inherently "lossy" and labor-intensive and do not scale well to large, cyberphysical systems

## **Document-Intensive SE**

- Leads to siloed, disconnected views of system
- No guarantee of consistency between views
- Often delivered as PDFs, Excel, or other disjointed artifacts
- Difficult to review thoroughly

#### This is NOT a new problem!



# NEXT GIANT LEAP

#### Apollo Experience Report – Guidance and Control Systems

#### NASA TECHNICAL NOTE



#### NASA TN D-8249

#### APOLLO EXPERIENCE REPORT -GUIDANCE AND CONTROL SYSTEMS

Raymond E. Wilson, Jr.

Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center Houston, Texas 77058



NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION • WASHINGTON, D. C. • JUNE 1976

#### Concluding Remarks and Recommendations, Page 13

2. A failure-analysis technique should be developed to assist in the identification of single-point failures. The Apollo method, in which many engineers must search diagrams for problems, is not altogether successful for complex systems.

## MBSE and SysML


- Competent Model-Based Systems Engineering (MBSE) is the foundation for the "digital thread" that is needed to manage the complexities of modern product development
- SysML is the dominant language for executing system models in support of MBSE
- A well-formed SysML model includes:
  - Behavior (what elements do and how they collaborate, including robust input/output definition)
  - Structure (parts/components/assemblies)
  - Interfaces (connections/flows)
  - Parametrics (equations that govern system behavior or properties)
  - Requirements (with automatic conformance assessment)

#### MBSE Evolution: MBSE 1.0

• Recreating traditional artifacts in a more sophisticated tool: Drawing  $\rightarrow$  Diagram

Configuration control was limited or non-existent

### Our Challenge: MBSE Missteps



- MBSE efforts stall because they fail to grasp the opportunities inherent in the new approach
  - Confounding the outcome with the means
  - Excessive focus on diagrams/views vs. data
- Models can be more consistent and coherent...but it takes skill and effort to achieve that end

### MBSE Evolution: MBSE 2.0

- Evaluates the use for every potential modeling artifact before creating it:
  - What question am I trying to answer?
  - What risk/technical debt am I buying down?
  - What "bang for the buck" am I getting?
- Evaluates the method applied to creating each modeling artifact for elegance, efficiency, and effectiveness ... even at the expense of language purity
  - What is the fewest number of clicks I can make to achieve my intended use?
  - How can I reuse what is previously created to achieve new uses through inference?
- Maximizes reuse to minimize the opportunities for inconsistency
- Ensures complete synchronization between structure, behavior, and interfaces

#### **MBSE 2.0 and Pragmatism**

"...this involves a willingness to trade off theoretical purity or future perfection in favor of getting things done today." p. 26 "...a willingness to experiment and be proven wrong. This means we try stuff. We fail. Then we use the lessons from that failure in the next experiment." p.27

Apprenticeship Patterns: Guidance for the Aspiring Software Craftsman (2009) David H. Hoover & Adewale Oshineye. O'Reilly Media

# "I don't care what anything was **designed** to do, I care about what it **can** do."

Gene Kranz, as portrayed by Ed Harris, Apollo 13, 1995

#### The Importance of Elegance in Modeling

Every modeling effort has several factors that may be used to describe it:

- $\eta$  = Efficiency factor = output/input (0 <  $\eta$  < 1)
- $\epsilon$  = Effectiveness factor = ability to accomplish intended outcome (0 <  $\epsilon$  < 1)
- $\phi$  = Elegance value (0 <  $\phi$  < 1)

# η ε = φ

### The Importance of Elegance in Modeling

• Language, tool, and method each have their own contributions to this equation:

$$\eta_{\text{language}} \, \varepsilon_{\text{language}} \, \eta_{\text{tool}} \, \varepsilon_{\text{tool}} \, \eta_{\text{method}} \, \varepsilon_{\text{method}} = \phi$$

Once the tool and language are selected, those terms are effectively constants...so any modeler is only able to directly influence:

 $\eta_{\text{method}} \; \epsilon_{\text{method}}$ 

The NeMO Orbiter: A Demonstration Hypermodel, Vinarcik, Michael J., Ground Vehicle Systems Engineering and Technology Symposium, Novi, 2018

#### Nothing is Free

"One critical, inescapable fact is that every model element has a cost associated with its elicitation, creation, definition, and maintenance.

Therefore, if a system can be described rigorously and completely with *n* elements, each n + i, where i > 0, element adds no value and only increases cost."

The NeMO Orbiter: A Demonstration Hypermodel, Vinarcik, Michael J., Ground Vehicle Systems Engineering and Technology Symposium, Novi, 2018

### Inference Is Key

One way to minimize cost is to maximize inference...

- If f(x) = y, then defining x defines y
- In a similar way, if style guides and ontologies are followed, queries may be constructed that follow any number of "hops" in the model to return information of interest:
  - Properties
  - Usages
  - Related elements
- ▶ If the style guide and other rules are not followed, this breaks down.

#### The Larger Problem

- System modeling is a skills-based discipline.
- Models grow rapidly (10<sup>5</sup>-10<sup>6</sup> model elements)
- Not all model elements may appear on diagrams (diagram-centric review is hopeless)
- Reviewing tables and matrices takes time
- ► The need:
  - Make it "easy" for modelers to conform to a style guide/ontology/semantics
  - Minimize the administrivia in checking/enforcing compliance

#### The Solution: Validation Rules and Validation-Driven Metrics

- MagicDraw and other tools permit the creation of custom validation rules
- These may be aggregated into various validation suites and specify:
  - Elements to which they apply
  - Error message
  - Severity
  - The rule itself
- Rules may be shared in profiles and may be run automatically or upon demand (including mandatory validation before committing to a collaboration server)

# SAIC Digital Engineering Profile

- Provided free of charge to the worldwide system modeling community
- Intended to improve model quality and accelerate training of competent system modelers
- Consists of:
  - Validation rules
  - Customizations
  - Supporting documentation
  - How-to videos
- Licensed as specified in the model
- Supported with a model-based style guide and example model (Ranger lunar probe)
- Updated at SAIC's discretion (in part, based upon feedback from the modeling community)

Supports SysML in MagicDraw/Cameo System Modeler (Dassault Systèmes) and Rhapsody

## SAIC Digital Engineering Validation Tool

 Shipshape and Bristol Fashion: Model Documentation and Curation to Facilitate Reuse (Vinarcik/Jugovic, 2019 NDIA Systems and Mission Engineering Conference) discussed the use of automated validation in systems modeling:

"When a model passes validation, you KNOW it is compliant...Validation is fast and consistent, Seconds/Minutes vs. Hours"

- SAIC released its Digital Engineering Validation Tool in December 2019:
  - VI.0 (December 2019—126 rules):
    - Initial customizations
    - Videos
  - VI.5 (April 2020—153 rules)
    - Model-based Style Guide
    - Example model (Ranger lunar probe)
    - Rhapsody rules
  - VI.6 (August 2020—164 rules)
    - Classification/Data Rights customization
  - VI.7 (January 2020—184 rules)
    - FMEA customization

### Why Use a Model Style Guide?

- SysML provides too many options—a model style selects an optimal set of options an organization agrees to restrict themselves to:
  - Everyone uses the same options
  - Only a portion of the language is used
- Engineers new to modeling need to focus representing their technical content in the model, not selecting the best modeling technique
- Training can be shorter and more effective
- Model analysis is easier to implement
- Model-to-Model compatibility is improved
- Integration of the model with external tools (i.e., a dashboard or PLM tool) is simplified

#### A Style Guide Is a Key Enabler for MBSE Program Success

#### Why Validation Is Important


- Automatic validation drives:
  - Consistency with a given style (use of relationships, properties, etc.)
  - Completeness (required properties and usage)
- This facilitates mapping of the system model to other data models

Without a consistent Rosetta Stone, exposing information to the enterprise is impossible!



#### 2020 ASEE Conference Paper:

#### Treadstone: A Process for Improving Modeling Prowess Using Validation Rules



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# Mars Octet Model Sizes (3 DEC 2020: 74 Days) Novices Can Mature Models When Supported by Automation

Model	Info	Errors	Size	Pages
Collection Rover	0	0	25,614	246
Retrieval Lander	0	0	11,259	153
Fetch Rover	0	0	15,343	139
Ascent Rocket	0	0	23,721	301
Return Orbiter	0	0	16,572	117
Mars Expedition Ice Mapper	0	0	24,970	243
Mars NAVCOM	72	167	18,127	262
Mission Control/Deep Space Network	474	0	12,271	148
Integration Model	13	12	5,892	1,651

#### https://hypermodeling.systems

#### SAIC's Example Model: Ranger Lunar Probe

- Constructed in support of SAIC's Validation Tool
  - · Rigorous, well-defined relationships enforced with automatic validation
  - Example structure: Functions are represented as operations owned by the performing block
- Original model is freely available for download: <u>https://www.saic.com/digital-engineering-validation-tool</u>
- Modified for this topic to as proof of concept


All analysis that requires components & functions should reference this directly

Control Jets «Block» «logical» 💭 Control Jets Input Voltage : IEC80000-6 Electromagnetism Temperature Range : ISO80000-5 Thermody Input Power : ISO80000-4 Mechanics::Quant Thrust Min : ISO80000-4 Mechanics::Ouantiti --- 🔲 in : ~40 Logical Architecture::Logical Interfa --- 🔲 inout : ~40 Logical Architecture::Logical Inte • out : 40 Logical Architecture::Logical Interfa in : ~40 Logical Architecture::Logical Interfa --- 🔲 out : 40 Logical Architecture::Logical Interfa ⊡ ○ Change Y Axis Rotation(: 40 Logical Archited ⊡ ○ Change Z Axis Rotation( argument : 40 Logic ⊡ ○ Change X Axis Rotation(: 40 Logical Archited . Open Valve( parameter : 40 Logical Architect E ← O Close Valve(parameter : 40 Logical Architect)

#### **Source Model Must be Well-Formed to Enable Analysis**

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
#### **SAIC FMEA Profile**



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#### **States and Failure Modes**

- A failure mode is a sub-optimal state (state customized as Failure)
- Transitions that lead to a Failure are a Cause of Failure
- When a component enters a Failure state, some operations become unavailable, which are the local effect of failure
- When a component enters a failure state, additional undesirable behaviors may occur, which can be defined as operations customized as Malfunctions, and contribute to defining local effects of failure.




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### SAIC FMEA Profile: State and Mission-Thread Driven Analysis

#	Name	Owned Parameter	Available in State	Unavailable in State	Unavailable in Failures	Called On	Participates in (1st level up)	Participates in (2nd level up)	Participates in (3rd level up)	Possible Failures	△ Hazard	Hazard Severities
1	<ul> <li>Close Valve</li> </ul>	In parameter : Orientation Control Power		<ul> <li>Inactive</li> <li>Thrusting</li> <li>Control Jet State</li> <li>Thrusting</li> <li>Thrusting</li> <li>Inactive</li> <li>Inactive</li> </ul>	Insufficient Power Stuck Thruster Valve Insufficient Propelant							
2	O Open Valve		<ul> <li>Thrusting</li> <li>Thrusting</li> <li>Thrusting</li> </ul>	Inactive Control Jet State Inactive Inactive Inactive	Insufficient Power     Stuck Thruster Valve     Insufficient Propelant							
3	Change X Axis Rotation	out : Control Thrust X Axis     in : Orientation Propelant     out result : Orientation Propelant	Thrusting	<ul> <li>Inactive</li> <li>Thrusting</li> <li>Control Jet State</li> <li>Thrusting</li> <li>Inactive</li> <li>Inactive</li> </ul>	Insufficient Power     Stuck Thruster Valve     Insufficient Propelant		🔁 Maneuver		<ul> <li>Perform Automatic Maneuver</li> <li>Perform Manual Maneuver</li> </ul>	Cannot Target     Uncontrolled Thrus     Cannot Target     Uncontrolled Thrus		6 10
4	Change Y Axis Rotation	out : Control Thrust Y Axis     out : Orientation Propelant     in : Orientation Propelant	Thrusting	<ul> <li>Inactive</li> <li>Control Jet State</li> <li>Thrusting</li> <li>Thrusting</li> <li>Inactive</li> <li>Inactive</li> </ul>	Insufficient Power     Stuck Thruster Valve     Insufficient Propelant	-	🔁 Maneuver	-	<ul> <li>Perform Automatic Maneuver</li> <li>Perform Manual Maneuver</li> </ul>	Cannot Target     Uncontrolled Thrus     Cannot Target     Uncontrolled Thrus		6 10
5	Change Z Axis Rotation	<ul> <li>in argument : Orientation Propelant</li> <li>out parameter : Orientation Propelant</li> <li>out parameter1 : Control Thrust Z Axis</li> </ul>	Thrusting	<ul> <li>Inactive</li> <li>Thrusting</li> <li>Control Jet State</li> <li>Thrusting</li> <li>Inactive</li> <li>Inactive</li> </ul>	Insufficient Power     Stuck Thruster Valve     Insufficient Propelant	-	🔁 Maneuver		<ul> <li>Perform Automatic Maneuver</li> <li>Perform Manual Maneuver</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Cannot Target</li> <li>Uncontrolled Thrus</li> <li>Cannot Target</li> <li>Uncontrolled Thrus</li> </ul>		6 10

#### Use Cases, Hazards, and Final Effect of Failure

- When using a well-formed model, final effect of failure can be automatically derived from local effect of failure through inherent relationships to supported use cases (see next chart)
- A Hazard can be represented as an extension point of a use case, clarifying what happens when the use case is compromised
- A Hazard is assigned an coarse severity




#### Deriving Final Effect of Failure, Hazards, and Failure Severity

Each Failure state is assigned a severity by an engineer based reviewing the affected use cases, associated hazards, hazard severity, and owned Malfunctions.

#	Name	Owned Parameter	Available in State	Unavailable in State	Unavailable in Failures	Called On	Participates in (1st level up)	Participates in (2nd level up)	Participates in (3rd level up)	Possible Failures	△ Hazard	Hazard Severities
1	○ Close Valve	◎ in parameter : Orientation Control Power		<ul> <li>Inactive</li> <li>Thrusting</li> <li>Control Jet State</li> <li>Thrusting</li> <li>Thrusting</li> <li>Inactive</li> <li>Inactive</li> </ul>	Linsufficient Power	① Close Valve ① Close Valve ① Close Valve					Final ffects	
2	Open Valve		Thrusting	Inactive Control Jet State Inactive Inactive Inactive	Insufficient Power	윤 Open Valve 윤 Open Valve 윤 Open Valve						
3		<ul> <li>out : Control Thrust X Axis</li> <li>in : Orientation Propellant</li> <li>out result : Orientation Propellant</li> </ul>	Thrusting	<ul> <li>Inactive</li> <li>Thrusting</li> <li>Control Jet State</li> <li>Thrusting</li> <li>Inactive</li> <li>Inactive</li> </ul>	Linsufficient Power	记 Orientate Ranger(@ 记 X Thrusting			Perform Automatic Maneuver     Perform Manual Maneuver	<ul> <li>Cannot Target</li> <li>Uncontrolled Thru</li> <li>Cannot Target</li> <li>Uncontrolled Thru</li> </ul>		n <mark>6</mark> 10
4		out : Control Thrust Y Axis     out : Orientation Propellant     in : Orientation Propellant	Thrusting	<ul> <li>Inactive</li> <li>Control Jet State</li> <li>Thrusting</li> <li>Thrusting</li> <li>Inactive</li> <li>Inactive</li> </ul>	▲ Insufficient Power ▲ Stuck Thruster Valve	윤 Orientate Ranger( 한 윤 Y Thrusting		<u> </u>	Perform Automatic Maneuver     Perform Manual Maneuver	<ul> <li>Cannot Target</li> <li>Uncontrolled Thru</li> <li>Cannot Target</li> <li>Uncontrolled Thru</li> </ul>		n 6 10
5	Local	<ul> <li>in argument : Orientation Propellant</li> <li>out parameter : Orientation Propellant</li> <li>out parameter 1 : Control Thrust Z Axis</li> </ul>	Thrusting	<ul> <li>Inactive</li> <li>Thrusting</li> <li>Control Jet State</li> <li>Thrusting</li> <li>Inactive</li> <li>Inactive</li> </ul>	Linsufficient Power	① Orientate Ranger(/ e ① Z Thrusting			O Perform Automatic Maneuver     O Perform Manual Maneuver	<ul> <li>Cannot Target</li> <li>Uncontrolled Thru</li> <li>Cannot Target</li> <li>Uncontrolled Thru</li> </ul>	-	on 6 10

## Assigning & Calculating Probabilities of Occurrence

- Each Cause of Failure is assigned a Occurrence and Detection
  - In this example, we use a scale of 1-10 from ASQ, but more precise numerical values can be applied (https://asq.org/quality-resources/fmea)
- Each Cause of Failure has a Severity which is pulled from the Severity of the Failure state (see previous)
- Each Cause of Failure has a calculated Criticality and RPN



Cause Detection	Cause Occurence	Cause Criticality	Cause RPN
8	3	24	120
5	7	35	175
	Detection 8	Detection Occurence 8 3	Detection         Occurence         Criticality           8         3         24

## Finalizing the Analysis

#### All Cause of Failure transitions to a Failure state contribute the Criticality and RPN

J#	Name	Severity	Maximum Occurrence	Maximum RPN	Causes of Failure	Cause Detection	Cause Occurence	Cause Criticality	Cause RPN	Malfunctions	Unavailable Functions	Affected Use Cases	Failures	Hazard	Hazaro Severit
					Figger:when (Under Voltage)	8	3	24	120		O Close Valve( parameter : 0	Perform Automatic Maneuv	Cannot Target	<ul> <li>Suboptimal Data Collection</li> </ul>	6
					Figger:when (Loose Cable)	5	7	35	175		Open Valve( parameter : (	Perform Manual Maneuver	Our Controlled Thrust	<ul> <li>Mission Failure</li> </ul>	10
	A Insufficient Power	c	7	175							O Change X Axis Rotation( :		Cannot Target		
1	Insumclenc Power	5	·	1/5							O Change Y Axis Rotation( :		Uncontrolled Thrust		
											O Change Z Axis Rotation( a				
											🔥 Uncontrolled Thrusting( :				
					{} Valve Stuck	2	3	6	60	\Lambda Uncontrolled Thrusting(	Olose Valve(parameter : 0)	Perform Automatic Maneuv	Cannot Target	<ul> <li>Suboptimal Data Collection</li> </ul>	6
					{ } Valve Stuck						Open Valve( parameter : 0	Perform Manual Maneuver	Our Controlled Thrust	<ul> <li>Mission Failure</li> </ul>	10
2	A Stuck Thruster Valve	10	3	60	{ } Valve Stuck						O Change X Axis Rotation( :		Cannot Target		
											O Change Y Axis Rotation( :		Our Controlled Thrust		
											O Change Z Axis Rotation ( a				

- Additional calculations can roll up these values to any useful level
- Results can be displayed and manipulated in the model
- Changes to values propagate immediately
- Note the *malfunctions* that occur in the failure state (in this case, "Uncontrolled Thrust")


#### The Hidden Benefit

- By adopting this approach, FMEA/FMECA analysis is embedded into the architecture and uses the same information (so it is always synchronized).
- The hazard/FMEA/FMECA analysis can also be segregated into a higher-level analysis model that uses the primary architecture model:
  - Prevents proliferation of properties/domain-specific additions into the primary architectural model
  - Isolates potentially sensitive/trade secret information

#### From Avoiding Engineering Gaffes: Automated Criticality Assessment

SAIC

#### and Error Detection (Nathan J.Vinarcik, 2021 INCOSE Great Lakes Regional



This presentation consists of SAIC general capabilities information that does not contain controlled technical data as defined by the International Traffic in Arms (ITAR) Part 120,10 or Export Administration Regulations (EAR) Part 734.7-11. 1 💿 SAIC. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED 1

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Transmit

# Legacy Systems & Digital Engineering (DE) Opportunities

- Own the technical baseline
  - Break out of vendor lock
  - · Apply more modern analytical techniques to solve problems
  - · Speed capability development and deployment
- Join the Internet of Things (IoT)/Develop a Digital Twin
  - Predict failures in the field
  - Dynamic spares management and support
- Impact Analysis
  - · Plan upgrades with more precise cost/time estimating
  - Avoid unintended impacts
- ► Federated Architecture Participation
  - Represent your system in emerging System of Systems architectures
- Comply with Initiatives and Policies
  - ...but do you want to check the box or realize value? (Hint: both cost money)

#### Videos

- Style Guide Overview
- Style Guide Demonstration
- Failure Analysis Demonstration
- Moxie Demonstration
- Classification Profile Demonstration

# Conclusions

#### Competent SysML Modeling


- A well-formed system model in SysML provides a rigorous, unambiguous representation of a system's architecture at any level of abstraction
- Queries, validation rules, and derived work products ensure stakeholders receive valid information
- Competent modeling delivers rigor at the speed of relevance
- Automatic validation dramatically improves model quality, facilitates other analysis, and enables information to be encoded properly for sharing throughout the digital thread
- Synchronization of federated tools, driven by authoritative information in the system model, improves collaboration and communication across all disciplines



Tempo and Momentum Are Key: Get Started!

# "We'll start the war from right here!" Brigadier General Theodore Roosevelt, Jr. Utah Beach 06 JUN 1944

# SAIC Digital Engineering



SAIC DE Profile & Validation Rules:

https://www.saic.com/digital-engineeringvalidation-tool